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REFLECTIONS FROM ROLLING RIDGE IN THE POST-SOVIET ERA--
CHRISTENDOM OR DIASPORA? 
by Paul Peachey
Dr. Paul Peachey (Mennonite) is study director at the Rolling Ridge Study Retreat 
Community. A retired sociologist from the Catholic University of America, he has 
participated for several decades in both academic and church exchanges between the 
USA and eastern Europe, most recently through the Council for Research in Values and 
Philosophy. Dr. Peachey is a past president of CAREE and a frequent contributor to this 
periodical. 
During October, 1993, a small team of scholars, sponsored by the Council for Research 
in Values and Philosophy (CRVP), independently based at the Catholic University of 
America in Washington, D.C., met in a series of locally co-sponsored symposia in five 
cities in central Europe. In Warsaw and Lublin (Poland), the topic was the church and 
public life. In Budapest (Hungary) and Prague and Brno (Czech Republic), the venue and 
themes were secular. All dealt with the post-Soviet turmoil and possibilities. These events 
were part of a continuing dialogue, begun precariously already during the former Soviet 
era. 
The Iron Curtain, and the Cold War that sustained it, dichotomized Europe artificially 
into East and West, imposing two crude stereotypes on realities that are far more 
complex. A band of unwilling satellite countries buffered the Soviet empire proper on its 
western frontier--Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, indeed a second tier as 
well, initially consisting of the German Democratic Republic, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. 
The last was sufficiently removed geographically to opt out of the Soviet bloc, though 
retaining a communist regime on its own. 
These countries, though characterized by enormous internal and historical differences, 
possessed a certain central European identity and consciousness, distinct from what lay to 
the east and the west. Historically they were pressured by forces from both directions. To 
some extent the Iron Curtain coincided with the boundaries between Eastern and Western 
Christendom, but only inexactly. In the three countries in focus here, Hungary (former) 
Czechoslovakia, and Poland, the western church prevailed (primarily Roman Catholic, 
though the first two included sizable Protestant minorities as well). 
For Central Europe, a Third Way? 
Could, or should, a central European grouping emerge as a third way between east and 
west in the post-Soviet era? Beyond the historical legacy, two contemporary impulses 
suggested that option. First is the lingering uneasiness about wester support to counter 
pressures from the east, a uneasiness strongest in the Czech lands, that began with the 
Munich 'sell-out' in 1938, and was reinforced in subsequent upheavals in all three 
countries during the Soviet era, when people had hoped for assistance from the West. 
Secondly, given the welfare state features of the previous regimes, there is some anxiety 
about too rapid a plunge into the insecurities inherent in market economies. Conceivably 
a middle way might be devised. 
Regional interdependencies are normal in any case and will find new expression the years 
ahead. But that such interdependencies will sustain an independent alternative for these 
countries is improbable. The drive for full participation in both the European and global 
systems is far too strong and the genuine resources for central European autonomy far too 
weak to sustain a third grouping. Yet meanwhile the complexity of problems and forces 
in all these countries is truly daunting. 
The Human Prospect
The symposia here described focused on the spiritual dimensions of the new situation, 
spiritual understood in both secular and religious terms. Both elements were part of the 
mix in all five symposia, though as indicated, in Hungary and the Czech Republic, the 
former note was dominant, in Poland, the latter. In all instances, however, religion 
referred to the legacy of Christendom, which had been the cultural matrix of all these 
lands. Secularization, quite apart from the Marxist interlude, is the most pronounced in 
Hungary. In Czech lands, where the memory of the fifteenth century Hussite reforms 
persists and where some compulsory re-Catholicizing occurred, Catholic consciousness is 
less certain. In Poland, despite a liberal, pluralist past, reaching back to the Reformation 
era, the Catholic Church has long been the guarantor of the nation under alien political 
rule. There Catholic identity is strongest. 
The Church and Solidarnosc
Solidarity, the movement of Polish workers during the 1980s, led by Lech Walesa, 
supported by the Church, and invigorated by several visits from the Polish Pope, John 
Paul II, was well publicized here in the USA. Historians will long debate the importance 
of these catalysts in bringing an end to the Soviet epoch generally. Whatever the facts, 
these developments enhanced tendencies, already present, to conflate the Catholic and 
Polish identities. Yet as Solidarnosc went rapidly from protest to political participation 
and responsibility, fragmentation was inevitable. In an early fall election, Catholics lost 
and reformed communists staged a partial come-back. 
Thus the stage was set for the Warsaw symposium, sponsored on the Polish side by the 
nationally dispersed Club of Polish Catholic Intellectuals (KIK). For this occasion the 
American team grew to a dozen persons, a number of them nationally known figures. The 
experiences of the churches in public life, USA and Poland, were compared. Though 
views of the American participants ranged somewhat across the political spectrum, all 
were committed to the principles of the separation of church and state, religious liberty, 
and the values of Vatican II. This last point was of signal importance throughout. Only 
since the "Great Transformation" (1989) has a larger engagement with the thought of 
Vatican II 
become possible in all these lands. 
In the end, however, the attraction of a strong political presence for the church persisted, 
possibly the formation of a Christian democratic party, such as appeared in several 
western countries after World War II. At this stage, however, and especially for an 
outside observer, prediction of the outcome would presumptuous. A Polish sociologist 
and priest, asked near the end of the final meeting in Lublin, what the most urgent 
problem or consideration is today, answered in a single word: "chaos!"--unpredictability 
in all sectors of life in society. Christianity, sedimented in the culture, the art and the 
architecture of Europe, remains a powerful undercurrent in eastern Europe. A participant 
in Budapest characterized herself as an "atheistic Catholic," in her country hardly an 
isolated case. The Christian legacy in the culture has a life of its own, shaping the life of 
believers and unbelievers alike. In that sense, Christianity survives as memory in 
architectural and artistic monuments, and in some instances as source for hopes for the 
restoration of Christian dominance in public life. 
This participant in these symposia, invited as a "free church" exponent, argued that 
whatever the validity of "Christendom" in the past, that is, of a publicly-dominant, 
institutional Christianity, emerging pluralism of societies today, rules out its revival 
today. Indeed, the theological foundation of that vision has always been dubious. That, in 
the words of Handel's great oratorio, the "kingdoms of this world" will become "the 
kingdom of the Lord and of His Christ" is an eschatological, not a historical prediction. 
Already in post-exilic Judaism, the vision of the mission of the people of Covenant 
dispersed among the nations was taking shape, and became increasingly explicit in the 
New Testament era. Salt, light, leaven, hence dispersion (Gr. diaspora) are the pertinent 
images. 
Biblical people are called to witness, not to rule, to follow Christ, not to impose rules on 
people not professing the faith, and that task is more than enough to engage us in our 
churches. For Poles and Americans alike, the memory of Christendom can easily become 
a liability. Jaroslav Pelikan, a Harvard historian, wrote recently: "Tradition is the living 
faith of the dead; traditionalism is the dead faith of the living." 
 
